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I. INTRODUCTION  
In 2018, for the third time, the Fidesz-KDNP 
party coalition secured a two-thirds majority 
in the Hungarian Parliament in the general 
parliamentary elections. The old-new Gov-
ernment, led by Prime Minister Viktor Or-
bán, adopted the Seventh Amendment to the 
Fundamental Law that obstructs the accom-
modation of migrants, limits the freedom of 
assembly and establishes the High Admin-
istrative Court, outsourcing administrative 
justice from the ordinary judiciary to special 
courts administered partly by the Minister of 
Justice. These constitutional developments 
point towards creating a non-reversible po-
litical system based on authoritarian rule. 
The autonomy of the social subsystems is 
gradually being eliminated: media, culture, 
science, education, etc., are captured by the 
State. In 2018, the Government continued to 
reorganize education and science, the Cen-
tral European University was forced to give 
up a part of its activities in Budapest and the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, which is 
an autonomous institution according to the 
Fundamental Law, is under forced restruc-
turing. Some education programmes, such 
as the gender programmes, were prohibit-
ed at universities. Research activities will 
be influenced by centrally defined research 
projects. State capture extends to the princi-
ples of liberal constitutionalism, such as the 
separation of powers, the independence of 
the judiciary or legal certainty. Legislation is 
not introduced duly in advance, official ne-
gotiations do not influence the outcome of 
political decisions and implemented law is 
often not clear and consequent. Independent 
State institutions, such as the Constitutional 
Court, are losing power and relevance. Due 
to the transformation of its competences and 
the lack of petitions from State authorities, 
as well as the appearance of loyalty regard-
ing certain politically sensitive questions, 
the Constitutional Court is not the watchdog 
of constitutionalism any more. This report 
describes the Seventh Amendment to the 
Fundamental Law as the major constitution-
al change, and explains important cases from 
Constitutional Court jurisprudence to show 
the lack of outstanding decisions that would 
balance the Government’s policy.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The Government, using its two-thirds majori-
ty in Parliament, adopted the Seventh Amend-
ment to the Fundamental Law in 2018. 
The original 2011 text of the Fundamental 
Law used the concept “historical constitu-
tion” as a reference point to constitutional-
ism in the National Avowal (Preamble) and 
also as a method of interpretation. However, 
as Hungary has a written constitution, the 
role of these provisions were still not clear, 
and many scholars attributed a purely sym-
bolic force to this, although there were Gov-
ernment attempts to emphasize its central 
role. Finally, the Seventh Amendment de-
??????????????????????????????? ???????????????
honour the achievements of our historical 
constitution and we honour the Holy Crown, 
which embodies the constitutional continu-
ity of Hungary’s statehood and the unity of 
the nation,” shall be supplemented in the Na-
??????????????????? ????????????????????????
hold that it is a fundamental obligation of the 
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State to protect our self-identity, rooted in 
our historical constitution.” As explained in 
our 2016 report, the concept of constitutional 
identity was introduced by the Constitution-
al Court (CC) in its Decision 22/2016 (XII. 
5). The CC primarily functions as a shield 
against the implementation of EU Law by 
protecting the fundamental rights laid down 
in the Fundamental Law as well as Hunga-
ry’s inalienable right of disposal related to its 
territorial integrity, form of government and 
governmental organisation. Furthermore, 
since the Amendment, all state organs shall 
protect the constitutional self-identity of 
Hungary. The Seventh Amendment, and also 
the new case law of the Constitutional Court, 
highlights that constitutional self-identity 
is to be protected through respect for the 
achievements of the historical constitution. 
This blurs the boundaries of the concept of 
the written constitution.
As to the development of fundamental 
rights, privacy received elevated protection 
by the Seventh Amendment by prescribing 
that the exercise of freedom of expression 
and the right of assembly shall not harm oth-
ers’ private and family life and their homes. 
This provision, however, limited the freedom 
of assembly that also appeared in the codifi-
cation of the new act on freedom of assem-
bly. It is problematic that the original raison
d’être of this new regulation might have been 
a personal demand of leading politicians not 
to be disturbed by assemblies in front of their 
homes. New case law has yet to be born, but 
this constitutional environment undoubtedly 
changes the attitudes of the people.
The Government also reacted to the most topi-
cal issue of migration by amending the Funda-
mental Law to declare that no alien population 
will be settled in Hungary, and that immigra-
tion will be based only on individual applica-
tions. A major human rights controversy is the 
challenge of migration. Hungary has decided 
to respond to it with a constitutional amend-
ment that is contradictory at least to the spirit 
of European human rights standards by being 
clearly exclusive and paternalist towards Hun-
garian inhabitants.
 Concerning the separation of powers, a great 
change has been introduced into the Hungar-
ian legal system by the Seventh Amendment. 
This is the introduction of separate admin-
istrative courts. At the end of 2018, a new 
act was adopted by the two-thirds majority in 
Government. Separate administrative courts 
have their roots in Hungarian constitutional 
history, but the safeguards of independence 
are quite weak in the new system to be in-
troduced in 2020. The administration of this 
branch of judiciary is, e.g., separate from 
ordinary administration and the Minister of 
Justice has competencies in the appointment 
and removal of judges. 
Finally, the Seventh Amendment that pro-
vided for a new constitutional framework in 
2018 introduced not only structural changes 
in matters of adjudication but also influenced 
matters of interpretation. It is quite rare that 
constitutions provide for specific clauses on 
the mandatory methods of interpretation. In 
Hungary, the Fundamental Law contained 
such provisions and these were supplement-
ed with others in 2018.
According to the new rule, “In the course of 
the application of law, courts shall interpret 
the test of the legal regulations primarily in 
accordance with their purposes and with the 
Fundamental Law. Primarily, the preamble 
of the legal regulation, and the reasoning of 
the legal regulation or its amendment, shall 
be taken into account when the purposes of 
???? ?????? ???????????? ???? ??????????????????
interpreting the Fundamental Law or legal 
regulations, it shall be presumed that they 
serve moral and economical purposes which 
are in accordance with common sense and 
the public good.” [Article 28]
In sum, the Seventh Amendment to the Fun-
damental Law adopted in 2018 by the two-
thirds Government majority in Parliament 
changed the constitutional framework of 
human rights and the separation of powers 
??????????????????????????????? ?? ??????????-
er the case law of the Constitutional Court 
in this changing constitutional environment.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. 3199/2018. (VI. 21.) CC order and 
3200/2018. (VI. 21.) CC order: postponing the 
decision-making on lex CEU
The Amendment of the National Tertiary 
Education Act, adopted in one week, intro-
duced new conditions for the operation of 
universities accredited outside the Europe-
an Economic Area (EEA) in Hungary and is 
applicable also to existing higher education 
institutions, including the Central European 
University (CEU). It has given rise to much 
criticism, both domestically and internation-
ally, including by the Council of Europe Par-
liamentary Assembly and the Venice Com-
mission. In our report of 2017, we explained 
that the constitutional complaint of the CEU 
and the ex-post review initiated by one-
fourth of the MPs had been before the court 
for months and it applied procedural tools 
(otherwise very rare) to postpone the deci-
sion: it created an ad hoc committee consist-
ing of the law clerks of the court to “prepare 
the decision-making procedure” of the case. 
On the proposal of the committee, the court 
asked further clarification from the claim-
????? ???? ???????? ?????? ????????????????? ?????
predicted that the court would have to decide 
this case in 2018, even if it is politically sen-
sitive. It has decided—but not in an expected 
way. In June 2018, the Constitutional Court 
suspended its procedure until the decision on 
the infringement procedure against Hungary 
at the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU). The court justified its decision by 
the obligation of the cooperation of courts 
within the European Union: as the funda-
mental rights in the Fundamental Law that 
were violated according to the motions are 
closely related to the fundamental rights en-
shrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union, the court had to post-
pone its decision. This reasoning, which may 
otherwise be well founded, begs questions in 
that the practice of the Constitutional Court 
usually does not follow the practice of the 
CJEU, and did not find it necessary to make 
similar steps in previous cases when pro-
cedures before the CJEU were in progress. 
As Justice Stumpf stated in his concurring 
140 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
opinion, the requirement of the suspension 
was not fulfilled, as the case did not depend 
on the decision of the CJEU, and it was not 
justified by legal certainty, a particularly im-
portant interest of the petitioner or any other 
particularly important reason, as the Act on 
Constitutional Court requires. Therefore, it 
seems that the court rather wanted to avoid 
political conflict with the Government, or at 
least postpone it again.
2. 23/2018. (XII. 28.) CC decision: constitu-
tional complaint of a state institution
?????????????????????????????????? ?????? ????
bagatelle case, it shows that to favor a State 
institution, the Constitutional Court is ready 
to confront the ordinary courts, overcome 
its decades-long practice, internal rules, and 
even the logics of reasoning. 
The topic of the 8:7 decision is a simple in-
terpretation of a statutory provision that pre-
scribes the decision on the board of directors 
of the Hungarian National Bank (HNB) in an 
investigation but makes it possible to delegate 
the “issuance”—the question is whether this 
issuance means only signing or also delegated 
decision-making (the vice president decided 
in this case). The ordinary courts, and in the 
end the Curia as the highest forum, decided 
that it was clear from systematic interpreta-
tion that it meant only signing, so it annulled 
the decision of the HNB and ordered a new 
procedure. The HNB submitted a constitu-
tional complaint, stating that by not looking 
at the reasoning of the bill (which suggests 
the opposite interpretation of the statutory 
provision), the Curia did not follow Article 
28 of the Fundamental Law that prescribes 
that courts shall interpret the acts primarily by 
their purposes. 
The decision is problematic in many ways. As 
some of the dissenting opinions pointed out, 
the Constitutional Court set itself against its 
previous practice (and even its Rules of Pro-
cedure) by deciding in a case where the Curia 
annulled the judgment and ordered a new pro-
cedure. This not only made the CC decision 
premature but also interfered with the normal 
decision-making of the ordinary judicial sys-
tem by excluding the possibility of changing 
its decision. The other aspect of the interfer-
ence with the ordinary courts’ function is that 
the court reviewed the decision based on the 
interpretative methods used by the judge. As 
Justice Czine concurred, this is contrary to the 
principle that the courts interpret the statutes 
independently, and the Constitutional Court 
has to limit itself to establishing the consti-
tutional limits of the interpretation instead of 
deciding the case on its merits. Finally, the 
most problematic point is guaranteeing the 
right of initiating a constitutional complaint 
about State institutions. Previously, the deci-
sions of the Constitutional Court, based on 
the dogmatical standpoints elaborated by the 
German Federal Constitutional Court, made it 
clear that State institutions do not have funda-
mental rights, as these rights are guaranteed 
to individuals against the State. This decision 
ignores this dogmatical clarity and opens a 
way for the Constitutional Court to become 
a guardian of the interest of State institutions 
instead of protecting the fundamental rights 
of individuals.
3. 13/2018. (IX. 4.) CC decision: real constitu-
tional standards in a neutral case
The Constitutional Court declared uncon-
stitutional the amendment to the “Act on 
??????? ????? ????? ??? ?????? ?????? ??? ????
proposal for preliminary norm control of 
the President (the head of the State). The 
purpose of the challenged provisions was to 
facilitate private water well drilling up to 80 
m in depth. In the case of private consump-
tion, such works could be performed without 
State authorization—contrary to the previous 
regulation, which required an official permit. 
The new provisions of the act authorized the 
Government to enact a decree regulating this 
field and prescribing those activities which 
do not require State authorization. The court 
asked for the opinion of the Hungarian Acad-
emy of Sciences, the ombudsman for future 
generations (deputy commissioner for fun-
damental rights) and the minister of interi-
or. The court also referred to the opinions of 
other professional organizations (university 
departments, associations, etc.).
The court accepted the arguments expressed 
by the President, finding the duty of the 
State to protect the environment follows 
from the provisions of the Fundamental 
????? ???????????????????????????????????????
court referred to international standards of 
environmental protection (non-derogation, 
precautionary principle) and reached the 
conclusion that the proposed change of the 
regulation is in conflict with the right to a 
healthy environment, as the State intends to 
play a more limited role in the protection and 
conservation of groundwater. The court did 
not examine the second question expressed 
by the President, namely whether the bianco 
authorisation of the Government to regulate 
this field is in accordance with the rule of 
law principle. Five justices attached dissent-
ing opinions to the decision.
Two comments should be added. First, the ex 
ante review initiated by the President (pres-
idential veto on constitutional ground) al-
ways has special relevance in the Hungarian 
governmental system. As we emphasized in 
our reports on 2017 and 2016, there is a trend 
that shows that the President turns to the 
Constitutional Court in politically less-sen-
sitive cases. This case is part of this trend as 
environmental protection is not part of the 
daily political agenda but rather a personal 
commitment of the President. Second, in 
this case, the court used, in an open manner, 
procedural techniques which can promote 
the deliberation of the concurring arguments 
of the debate (requesting opinions from the 
stakeholders and referring to the opinions of 
other professional organizations)—a prac-
tice which is not common in politically sen-
sitive cases.
4. 3130/2018. (IV. 19.) CC decision: permissive 
approach towards the political majority
The Constitutional Court declared unconsti-
tutional the Resolution of the Curia taken in 
an electoral dispute related to the 2018 par-
liamentary elections. The original case relat-
ed the placement of a billboard during the 
electoral campaign that depicted the prime 
minister and contained the slogan, “For us 
Hungary is the first!” The billboard was pub-
lished by the governing party (Fidesz), one 
of the electoral contestants. This fact was 
not evident, as it was indicated in extreme-
ly small letters that were visible only from a 
distance of one meter. Moreover, all the visu-
al elements of the billboard were identical to 
those used by the Government in its commu-
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nication. According to the objection filed by 
another party that took part in the electoral 
contest, the billboard was misleading and 
contrary to the procedural electoral princi-
ples of fairness and exercising rights in good 
faith, in accordance with their purpose. The 
Curia declared infringement in its decision, 
but only in the case of one billboard, placed 
near a highway. Identical billboards were 
placed at public spaces across the country.
The publisher of the billboard in question, the 
Fidesz party, filed a constitutional complaint 
against the decision of the Curia, claiming 
that the decision caused a disproportionate 
limitation of its freedom of speech in relation 
to the electoral campaign. The claimant also 
emphasized that the “visibility requirement” 
related to billboards and other electoral ma-
terials is not explicitly prescribed by law. 
The Constitutional Court did not include a 
detailed argumentation in the reasoning part 
of its decision. There is no substantive as-
sessment of the proportionality requirement 
related to the possible limitation of freedom 
of speech and of the similarities between the 
Government’s and governing party’s mes-
sages. The Constitutional Court declared 
that the Act on Electoral Procedures contains 
limitations on the publication of posters and 
billboards during electoral campaigns based 
on timing and their physical placement. In 
the court’s argumentation, it is a decisive 
argument that the act does not explicitly 
prescribe the “visibility” requirement of the 
imprints on billboards. It declared that the 
visibility requirement does not follow from 
the principle of the fairness of elections, and 
neither does the placement of the imprint on 
billboards. According to the court, if voters 
are in a position to identify the political ac-
tor whose interests are supported by the bill-
board, the principle of fairness is respected. 
The latter statement was criticized by one of 
the six concurring opinions.
Based on the decision, one can question 
whether the Constitutional Court accords 
due significance to procedural electoral prin-
ciples by maintaining a misleading commu-
nication practice which blurs the differences 
between the Government and the governing 
party. The latter is one of the electoral con-
testants, which therefore is in an overwhelm-
ingly advantageous position compared to 
other parties. The blurry dividing lines be-
tween the Government and the governing 
party also raise questions on the legal enti-
ties who are entitled to submit constitutional 
complaints. The decision can be evaluated 
also in the light of the debates between the 
Constitutional Court and the Curia, referred 
to in our report on 2017.
5. 3029/2018. (II. 6.) CC and 19/2018. (XI. 12.) 
CC decisions: protecting the interests of the 
State
In Decision 3029/2018. (II. 6.) CC, the Con-
stitutional Court rejected a constitutional 
complaint claiming the limitation of the 
right to property and other related rights in a 
case in which the Hungarian National Bank 
refused to issue a permit for a natural person 
living outside Hungary to acquire a quali-
fying holding in a financial enterprise. The 
reason for the refusal was the interpretation 
of the act regulating this field, which pre-
scribes that in the case of such acquisitions 
the source of the payment must be certified. 
Even though the claimant presented certifi-
cations issued by her personal bank and the 
tax authority indicating the sources of her 
income, the HNB (as the state organ respon-
sible for financial supervision) required a 
continuous certification of all transactions 
from the previous years that indicated the 
utilization of the specific amount of money 
planned to be used as payment for the ac-
quisition. The decision of the HNB was up-
held by the Administrative and Employment 
Court of Budapest and later by the Curia.
The claimant based her petition on three 
arguments: the limitation of the right to 
fair trial in relation to the ambiguity of the 
regulation, the limitation of the freedom of 
enterprise and the limitation of the right to 
property. In her view, the law prescribes only 
a single certification of the source of the pay-
ment, while requiring the certification of all 
transactions beginning from the time of en-
try of the amount of money in question into 
one’s property until the proposed acquisition 
is a contra legem interpretation and impos-
sible to comply with. The Constitutional 
Court did not accept these arguments. In the 
longest part of the reasoning, the court ex-
pressed that the right to property in private 
relations does not protect assets which are 
not acquired at present. The court accepted 
the interpretation of the law of the HNB and 
other judicial instances stating that these are 
in accordance with the possible purpose of 
the law (stable and prudent functioning of 
financial enterprises and lowering business 
risks). The court thus did not accept the ar-
guments related to the limitation of fair trial 
in this case. In relation to the freedom of en-
terprise, the court stated that starting certain 
business activities is not limited by law in 
this case.
One of the justices attached a concurring 
opinion to the decision, arguing that the 
court should have examined the limitation 
of the affected fundamental rights in detail 
based on substantive standards.
In Decision 19/2018. (XI. 12.) CC, the Con-
stitutional Court declared certain provisions 
of the Act on National Security unconstitu-
tional based on the proposal for ex post re-
view of the prosecutor general. Based on the 
challenged regulation, certain public profes-
sions and positions (including prosecutors) 
can only be held after the preliminary ex-
amination of national security risks. In this 
case, as was stated by the national security 
services, the given position can be occupied 
or sustained only with the individual approv-
al of the leader of the State organ in question. 
According to the prosecutor general’s view, 
it is problematic that the leaders of State or-
gans are not informed of this and of the facts 
that cause national security risk, and that 
the law does not contain any aspects to be 
considered when deciding on appointments 
or sustaining the appointments of those per-
sons affected by such examination. These 
controversies could cause a conflict with the 
requirement of clarity of norms (as part of 
the rule of law principle) and the freedom 
of occupation as well as the separation of 
powers, as the regulation limits the sphere of 
action of the prosecution service as an inde-
pendent state organ. Moreover, the prosecu-
tor general claimed that the system of appeal 
against the statements of the national securi-
ty service is not in accordance with the right 
to legal remedy.
142 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
In the last question (system of appeal), the 
Constitutional Court recalled the arguments 
expressed in a very similar former case (initi-
ated by the president of the Curia), and based 
on these, annulled certain provisions of the 
examined act. In the given case, it is much 
more relevant that the court declared certain 
provisions of the examined act unconstitu-
tional due to the fact that these contradicted 
the independence of the prosecution service, 
ensured in the Fundamental Law. However, 
the court did not refer to other provisions of 
the Fundamental Law and did not examine 
the position of the prosecution service within 
the system of the separation of powers.
As a result of both decisions described above 
(constitutional complaint regarding the deci-
sion of the Hungarian National Bank; poste-
rior norm control initiated by the prosecutor 
general), the Constitutional Court played a 
significant role in protecting the interests of 
state organs—a controversial issue, taking 
into consideration the function of consti-
tutional courts in protecting constitutional 
principles and individual rights.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
Recently, the decisions of the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court have become quite un-
predictable. Nevertheless, two interesting 
cases are foreseen in 2019. The court should 
decide on the initiatives of four judges who, 
suspending the cases before them, chal-
lenged the statutory amendments penalizing 
homelessness. One-fourth of the MPs initi-
ated an ex post review of the amendment of 
the Labor Act because it was adopted among 
critical circumstances in the Parliament 
(MPs of the opposition managed to hinder 
the regular procedure). 
?????? ???? ???????????? ????????? ?????????
parliamentary elections do not promise too 
much constitutional upheaval, an upcoming 
vacancy in the court may. Considering the 
high number of 8:7 decisions, the election 
of the new member will have a crucial im-
pact. As the governmental coalition has the 
two-thirds majority in the Parliament to elect 
the justice without the opposition, we do not 
have many illusions.
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